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Corporate Venture Capital Investments and Technological Performance: 
Geographic Diversity and the Interplay with Technology Alliances 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Firms are increasingly operating portfolios of geographically dispersed CVC investments for 
accessing a variety of location-specific knowledge, often alongside traditional external 
knowledge-sourcing strategies such as technology alliances. We examine the conditions under 
which geographic diversity in corporate venture capital (CVC) investments has positive 
consequences for firms’ technological performance in the context of simultaneously pursued 
technology alliance strategies. We find that geographic diversity in CVC portfolios enhances 
performance as long as firms avoid knowledge redundancy in knowledge-sourcing arising from 
geographic overlaps with technology alliances, and the managerial complexity, coordination 
costs, and resource constraints stemming from the simultaneous pursuit of diversity in both 
technology alliances and CVC investments. Our inferences draw on a panel data set on the 
patents, CVC investments, and technology alliances of 55 CVC-active firms in a variety of 
industries. 
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1. Introduction 
 Driven by rapid technological change and a surge in new entrepreneurial ventures that 
pursue pioneering technologies, corporate venture capital (CVC) activities have experienced 
significant growth over the last quarter century (Keil, 2004; Dushnitsky, 2006; MacMillan et al., 
2008; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005, 2006; Hill and Birkinshaw, 2015). An increasing global 
dispersion of technology development activities and hubs of innovative ventures (e.g. Chung and 
Yeaple, 2008; Lahiri, 2010, Belderbos et al., 2011) has also spurred an internationalization of 
CVC investments (Zahra and Hayton, 2008), with firms investing in promising ventures spread 
across locations each with their specialized expertise and knowhow.1 While a growing stream of 
research has examined the importance of CVC activities as an external knowledge-sourcing 
strategy of established firms (e.g. Chesbrough and Tucci, 2004; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006; 
Henderson and Leleux, 2002; van de Vrande, 2013) and has underscored that CVC activities can 
contribute to firms’ innovation performance (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005; Wadhwa and Kotha, 
2006; Keil et al., 2008; van de Vrande et al., 2011), prior research has not paid substantive 
attention to the  phenomenon of an increasing geographic spread of CVC investments.2 
 In this paper we contribute to the literature on CVC investments by examining why and 
when (under what circumstances) geographic diversity of CVC investments influences the 
investing firms’ technological performance. We conceptualize CVC investments as knowledge-
exploration instruments that can allow firms to access and recombine knowledge from distant 
                                                 
1 For instance, David Drummond, Google’s senior VP of corporate development, was quoted in the Financial Times 
on the occasion of establishing a dedicated European CVC unit as saying, “As we look out around the world, we 
realise that the tech ecosystems are getting bigger and stronger. Every European capital I travel to I see these start 
up clusters. It’s obvious that great companies will come out of these ecosystems”. ‘Google to create European 
venture capital arm’, Financial Times, July 10, 2014.  
2 A partial exception is Zahra and Hayton (2008), who found a positive association between cross-border CVC 
investments and other corporate venturing activities, and firms’ subsequent revenue growth. 
 
4 
 
technological and geographic contexts for improved technological performance (Rosenkopf and 
Almeida, 2003; Ahuja and Katila, 2004). In this conceptualization the potential benefits of the 
geographic diversity of knowledge search (the why question) derive from the notion that local 
firms and networks are embedded in unique technology search approaches and knowledge bases 
that are specific to local innovation systems (e.g. Phene et al., 2006). These local research 
traditions and scientific and technological strengths can spawn ventures that pursue unique 
approaches to technology development and that offer heterogeneous technological solutions (e.g. 
Furman et al., 2012). As a result, exploring new sources of knowledge outside traditional 
environments holds the promise of increasing the breadth of search, knowledge recombination, 
and cross-fertilization, thus improving the effectiveness of firms’ technology development 
activities (Ahuja and Katila, 2004; Lahiri, 2010; Zhang et al., 2010; Belderbos, Lokshin, 
Sadowski, 2015). 
 We examine the question when geographic diversity matters by considering the interplay 
with a similar knowledge sourcing mode: technology alliances. CVC investments have 
developed alongside firms’ existing technology alliance strategies (e.g. Keil et al., 2008; van de 
Vrande, 2013), but firms did not necessarily have organizational structures in place for 
facilitating the coordination between these strategies (e.g. Hill and Birkinshaw, 2015; 
Dushnitsky 2011). Technology alliances are similar to CVC investments in terms of the level of 
resource commitment, flexibility, explorative focus, and duration (van de Vrande, 2013; 
Dushnitsky and Lavie, 2010) and have exhibited a strong tendency towards internationalization 
(e.g. Lavie and Miller, 2008). Recent research on the propensity to engage in alliances and CVC 
activities suggests a complex balance between the two strategies, resulting from internal resource 
constraints, potential redundancy, and reputational and visibility effects (Dushnitsky and Lavie, 
2010). However, extant studies on knowledge-sourcing and firm performance, while recognizing 
that CVC investments are often used as technology-sourcing instruments in conjunction with 
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other external knowledge-sourcing strategies, have juxtaposed the various sourcing strategies 
without considering the potential synergetic or detrimental effects that their joint engagement 
could bring about (e.g., Keil et al., 2008; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; van de Vrande et al., 2011; 
Wadhwa and Kotha, 2006; Wadhwa et al., 2015). In this study, we take a portfolio perspective of 
CVC investments, following recent contributions to the CVC literature (Yang, Narayanan and 
De Carolis, 2014; Wadhwa et al., 2015; Matusik and Fitza, 2012), and extend this perspective to 
focus on firms’ broader knowledge exploration portfolio consisting also of technology alliances.  
 We develop hypotheses anchored in the literature on search, learning and innovation, to 
contribute to the ‘substantive’ theory of CVC investments (e.g. Burgelman, 2011; Basu et al., 
2015). Our aim is to better understand the consequences of the phenomenon of the 
internationalization of CVC investment portfolios in conjunction with firms’ technology alliance 
activities, but not to develop a general theory of search and organizational learning through CVC 
investments. Our framework detailing the effect of the geographic diversity of CVC investments 
on technological performance taking into account the moderating effects of simultaneous 
technology alliance activities is illustrated in Figure 1. Our baseline hypothesis is that the 
geographic diversity of CVC portfolios has a curvilinear relationship with technological 
performance. We then posit two ways in which the performance effects of CVC investments may 
be weakened if combined with a geographically diversified technology alliance portfolio. These 
relate to the managerial and coordination complexities of operating large, diverse portfolios of 
CVC investments and technology alliances simultaneously, and the potential sourcing of 
redundant country-specific knowledge and expertise due to pursuing CVC investments and 
technology alliances with the same technology focus in the same locations.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
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We test our hypotheses on a panel data set comprising patents, CVC investments, and 
technology alliances of 55 CVC-active firms in a variety of industries. Empirical results show 
that positive performance effects of CVC geographic diversity occur if firms do not 
simultaneously develop large and geographically overlapping technology alliance portfolios. 
2. Background and Theory 
Context-spanning knowledge search, learning and innovation 
The literature on search, learning and innovation highlights that distant search can increase 
firms’ capacity for knowledge recombination and innovation by exposing them to a wide range 
of fresh ideas, insights, and practices (Levinthal and March, 1993; Katila and Ahuja, 2002; 
Ahuja and Katila, 2004; Davis and Eisenhardt, 2011; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Lahiri, 2010; 
Leten, Belderbos, Van Looy, 2016). This view characterizes innovation processes as efforts to 
reconfigure knowledge situated in different domains into novel combinations (e.g. Fleming, 
2001). Increasing the variety in firms’ knowledge pool through distant search improves the 
extent to which knowledge combinations are possible, thereby augmenting innovation. Firms can 
enhance the variety of knowledge elements at their disposal by carrying out distant search in two 
dimensions: technological fields and geographic spaces (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Ahuja 
and Katila, 2004). 
Theories of search and organizational learning also suggest tradeoffs associated with 
knowledge (sourcing) diversity. First, variety in search can entail significant costs. These costs 
stem from the complexity associated with a broad array of search and learning routines, in 
particular, when search involves different technology sourcing strategies and different contexts 
in which they are employed (North, 1990; Parkhe, 1993; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Hoffmann, 
2007; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005). While routines facilitate the process of learning and 
interaction with partners, and hence smoothen knowledge exchanges (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 
2001), developing them specific to particular contexts and modes is costly and can trigger 
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competition for resources (Lavie et al., 2011). More generally, variety in knowledge sourcing 
strategies can spawn an array of different routines, which can exert a toll on the cognitive 
capacities of managers, increasing managerial complexities, and hence potentially weakening the 
recognition, integration and assimilation of knowledge and reducing the effectiveness of the 
knowledge-sourcing portfolio (e.g. Dess and Beard, 1984; Anderson, 1999; Ahuja and Katila, 
2004). Second, the multiplicity of search activities increases the likelihood of generating 
redundant knowledge, which reduces the variety of the knowledge sourcing portfolio and further 
diminishes the efficiency of knowledge search (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Vassolo et al., 
2004).  
CVC Investments and Innovation 
CVC investments have become a particularly popular mechanism for established 
companies to access newly created knowledge resources from entrepreneurial firms that possess 
unique technological capabilities and research approaches. Given the low resource commitments 
associated with CVC investments, firms are able to invest in novel initiatives undertaken by a 
wide range of start-up firms (Hurry, Miller and Bowman, 1992; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006; 
Basu, Phelps and Kotha, 2011; Allen and Hevert, 2007). The literature on CVC investments has 
highlighted several opportunities for corporate investors to tap into new ventures’ skills and 
expertise. Engagement in the due diligence process when assessing a venture’s technological 
attractiveness, resources, and operations enables an incumbent firm to learn about the new start-
up’s emerging products and technologies even before committing any resource (Chesbrough, 
2002; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). Incumbents can also learn about ventures’ key technologies 
and activities by taking board seats and by facilitating and establishing interchange activities. 
Corporate investors may even be able to benefit from investments in failed ventures if the 
technologies stay viable and feasible (Hoetker and Agarwal, 2004). 
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While CVC investments allow firms to keep abreast of developments in a variety of 
settings (Chesbrough, 2002; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005; Wadhwa and Kotha, 2006; Narayanan 
et al., 2009), ensuring efficient funneling of knowledge from the ventures requires the 
establishment of appropriate routines and procedures of interaction. These are likely to be 
different from their established search routines and organizational practices (Daft and Lengel, 
1986; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006). Research on CVC investments as instruments of knowledge 
sourcing is fairly nascent and generally suggests a positive contribution to firms’ innovation and 
financial performance (e.g. Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005; Wadhwa and Kotha, 2006; Keil et al., 
2008; van de Vrande et al., 2011; Zahra and Hayton, 2008). 
In the hypothesis development below, we build on these ideas to contribute to the 
substantive theory of CVC investments and innovation. We focus on a dimension of distant 
search that has not received much attention in the literature: search in distant and divergent 
geographical contexts. We elaborate the circumstances under which a geographically diversified 
CVC investment portfolio is beneficial for innovation in the context of the simultaneous pursuit 
of international technology alliances, and examine the effects of complexity and knowledge 
redundancy.  
Hypotheses 
Geographic Diversity of CVC Portfolios.  
CVC investments may involve distant search for novel technologies and approaches if 
they target ventures in a variety of locations. Geographic context is an important source of 
variety in the search and technology development due to differences in institutional, regulatory, 
and market contexts and the varying strengths and roles of participants in local innovation 
systems. It is widely acknowledged that national culture, institutions and infrastructure exert a 
significant influence on the process of technology development, generating different trajectories 
across countries in the same technological domains (Ahuja and Katila, 2004; Porter 1990). As 
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they manifest local idiosyncrasies, country-specific knowledge elements tend to be sticky, with a 
large share of tacit, uncodified components (Jaffe et al., 1993; Saxenian, 1994).  Thus even 
within finely defined technology domains, locational differences in innovation systems, context, 
and cognition lead to distinctive approaches to knowledge creation and to idiosyncratic research 
approaches (Phene et al., 2006). 
Accessing such novel knowledge calls for linking up with local firms because 
idiosyncratic knowledge, which contains important tacit knowledge elements embodied in local 
organizations and their employees (Winter, 1987; Song et al., 2003), seldom spills over beyond 
the geographic location in which it is created (Jaffe et al., 1993; Saxenian, 1994; Verspagen and 
Schoenmakers, 2004). Access to these distinct knowledge elements from multiple countries 
through a geographically broad search process increases the choice set available to firms for 
problem solving and provides opportunities for recombination and cross-fertilization of 
knowledge (Almeida et al., 2002; Leiponen and Helfat, 2011). In turn, this may contribute to 
developing cutting-edge technologies and the creation of first-mover advantages (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992; Almeida et al., 2002). For established firms, exposure to diverse knowledge sets 
acts as a bulwark against falling into the danger of learning traps that may arise from their 
tendency to rely too much on familiar partners and environments (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; 
Levinthal and March, 1993). New entrepreneurial ventures are likely to embody specific 
locational identities in search and tacit knowledge creation and provide an important means for 
accessing local idiosyncrasies in technology development. CVC investments thus expose 
incumbent firms to a valuable window on technology development associated with new research 
environments, innovation systems, and capabilities, allowing them to learn new skills and 
develop new technologies and applications (Zahra and  Hayton, 2008; MacMillan et al., 2008).  
While these arguments imply positive effects on innovation performance of a 
geographically diverse CVC investment portfolio, large extensions of portfolio diversity is costly 
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and may generate reduced marginal benefits. Distant search among disparate partners requires 
more efforts in the recognition and integration of relevant knowledge (Fleming, 2001) because 
differences in the nationality and culture of partners can be a source of potential distrust and 
conflict (Hamel et al., 1989; Parkhe, 1993). Therefore, effective identification and assimilation 
of knowledge from partners requires relationship-specific investments (Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Wadhwa et al., 2015). There may be limited scope economies if 
firms are unable to redeploy their expertise in identifying and integrating knowledge across 
ventures operating in different environments (Yang et al., 2014). Therefore, as firms’ portfolio of 
CVC investments becomes more diverse, interactions with a more diverse set of partners with 
different characteristics is likely to raise the costs of absorbing diverse knowledge elements, 
which reduces the efficiency of the portfolio (Dess and Beard, 1984; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
Anderson, 1999; Ahuja and Katila, 2004). Consequently, with increased geographic diversity of 
CVC investments, the ability to take optimal advantage of knowledge endowments in the 
portfolio may decrease. 
It follows that a geographically diversified portfolio of CVC investments is likely to 
enable firms to increase their technological performance but that at higher levels of geographic 
diversity, the positive effects are likely to diminish while the costs of diversity increase. This 
suggests a nonlinear relationship between geographic diversity of CVC investments and 
technological performance, leading to the following baseline hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 1 (geographic diversity): The geographic diversity of a firm’s CVC investment 
portfolio has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the firm’s technological performance. 
Complexity. Firms often simultaneously employ international CVC investment and 
technology alliance strategies aimed at knowledge sourcing. Both CVC investments and 
technology alliances are mechanisms designed for exploration of knowledge with a focus on 
emerging technologies, and they both share characteristics such as termination flexibility and 
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relatively low levels of commitment. At the same time, these two modes differ significantly in 
their approaches and practices with respect to inter-organizational relationships and knowledge 
exchanges. Whereas technology alliances involve mutual knowledge development and 
knowledge exchange and typically occur between established firms who share resources and 
costs, in CVC activities a target firm almost exclusively carries out the technology development 
processes, with the CVC investor providing mainly financial backing and, in some cases, 
strategic benefits such as offering solutions to short-term problems, allowing the venture to use 
its R&D facilities, or introducing the venture to its network (Dushnitsky, 2006; Dushnitsky and 
Lavie, 2010). 
Despite the benefits they can bring, geographically diversified portfolios that combine 
technology alliances with CVC investments may lead firms to face resource constraints and 
increased complexity of knowledge-sourcing that are likely to hamper effective learning. 
Complexity and increased demand on resources stem from heterogeneous knowledge-
management practices associated with the two modes of knowledge-sourcing (Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Zollo et al., 2002) as well as the characteristics of partners (Parkhe, 1993). Technology 
alliances and CVC investments entail the adoption of contrasting approaches to knowledge-
sourcing. Knowledge-assimilation practices of CVC investors include taking board memberships 
in ventures and entrusting managers to work as liaisons between themselves and ventures (Keil, 
2004; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006). Such linkages with new ventures are aimed at ensuring 
early identification of technological opportunities and providing timely assistance to the 
ventures. These practices diverge from those associated with technology alliances, where the 
focus is on explicit knowledge-sharing and gatekeeping (guarding outgoing knowledge flows) 
(e.g. Das and Teng, 2000). 
The differences between CVC investments and technology alliances imply the need to 
deploy different routines for knowledge identification, transfer, and integration. Routines are 
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considered integral to successful knowledge acquisition and integration because they reduce the 
transaction costs associated with the identification of resource owners, the sharing of tasks with 
partners, the monitoring of contracts, and the settling of disputes (Parkhe, 1993; Gulati and 
Singh, 1998). Since knowledge integration from CVC investments and technology alliances 
demand distinct routines, firms need to commit resources and managerial attention to develop 
routines specific to these two modes of knowledge sourcing. It is important to adopt the right set 
of routines, as routines that are appropriate for one mode may not be effective in another 
(Stettner and Lavie, 2014; Novick, 1988). Hence, learning in one mode of knowledge-sourcing 
cannot be easily leveraged in the other knowledge-sourcing mode. Firms with portfolios that 
combine the two strategies will therefore face reduced scope economies, while they forego the 
advantages of potential economies of scale arising from specializing in one mode of knowledge-
sourcing. While this drives up the cost of knowledge sourcing, it may also diminish the 
beneficial effects of a geographically diversified portfolio. If firms spread their resources too thin 
across a variety of routines, this may result in a diminished ability to identify, acquire, and 
recombine relevant knowledge. 
The geographic diversity of combined portfolios of technology alliances and CVC 
investments further exacerbates the complexity of knowledge-sourcing practices. Partners 
belonging to different national cultures follow different norms and customs in knowledge 
development and knowledge sharing (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Lavie and Miller, 2008). 
Understanding how to work effectively with alliance partners and CVC targets in different 
national contexts often necessitates developing specialized contextual knowledge and 
management routines and practices. The multiplicity of routines and the divergent knowledge-
sharing decision rules and practices in communities with heterogeneous languages and norms 
(Matusik and Fitza, 2012) generate difficulties in coordinating, strategizing, and sharing 
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experiences of the commonalities and differences between distant geographic locations and 
distinct partner types (Laursen and Salter, 2006; Foss et al., 2013; Gulati and Singh, 1998). 
It follows that the combination of geographic diversity and sourcing-mode diversity and 
the resulting need for devising disparate routines and practices increases the cost and limits the 
benefits of managing a knowledge sourcing portfolio of geographically diverse technology 
alliances and CVC investments. The associated complexity exerts significant pressures on 
managers’ scarce cognitive abilities and the firms’ limited resources, thereby impairing the 
ability to observe, transfer, coordinate, integrate and recombine relevant external knowledge 
(Wadhwa, Phelps and Kotha, 2015; Phene et al., 2006). Hence, the inverted-U shaped 
relationship between CVC geographic diversity and technological performance is expected to 
show a flatter curvature and an earlier turn into a downward slope.  
Hypothesis 2 (complexity). The geographic diversity of a firm’s technology alliance portfolio 
negatively moderates the positive association between the geographic diversity of the firm’s 
CVC investment portfolio and technological performance. 
Knowledge redundancy. While CVC investments and technology alliances may 
complement each other as technology-exploration strategies and hence each may lead to positive 
performance outcomes, a combined portfolio of diverse CVC investments and technology 
alliances can lead to sub-optimal outcomes if it generates redundant knowledge (Dushnitsky and 
Lavie, 2010). If these strategies lead to the creation of overlapping, redundant knowledge, the 
value of the portfolio is lower than the sum of the values of the individual investments (Vassolo 
et al., 2004; Mitchell, 1989; Dushnitsky and Lavie, 2010; Belderbos and Zou, 2009). 
In the context of geographically dispersed external knowledge-sourcing strategies, 
redundant knowledge can result when a firm’s knowledge-sourcing portfolio consists of 
technology alliances and CVC investments in an overlapping set of locations within the same 
technological domain. This may occur because alliances and CVC activities are typically 
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managed by different parts of the organization, making coordination of these strategies difficult 
(Dushnitsky and Lavie, 2010; Dushnitsky, 2011). Pursuing CVC investments and alliances 
simultaneously in the same foreign country and in the same technology field may, therefore, 
result in the pursuit of similar tacit and specialized knowledge elements in the country. As a 
consequence, the contribution of a firm’s CVC investments to knowledge variety diminishes 
when these are carried out in the same locations of the firm’s technology alliance activities. This 
will reduce the general efficiency of the knowledge-sourcing portfolio as more resources and 
attention are devoted to the specific technologies and locations than is warranted by the novelty 
of knowledge and insights they can generate. Aside from the direct cost associated with the 
duplication of efforts to access localized idiosyncratic knowledge, accumulation of redundant 
knowledge elements may also put a further toll on a firm’s cognitive resources, constraining 
managers’ ability to identify and filter out useful information that can enrich the knowledge pool 
available to the firm.  
These arguments suggest that simultaneous engagement in CVC investments and 
technology alliances in an overlapping set of countries within the same technology domain 
generates knowledge redundancies, weakens knowledge-recombination possibilities and the 
efficiency of the CVC investment portfolio, and therefore reduces technological performance: 
Hypothesis 3 (knowledge redundancy): Geographic overlaps between a firm’s portfolios of 
CVC investments and technology alliance activities within the same technology domain reduce 
the efficiency of a firm’s knowledge sourcing portfolio and are therefore negatively associated 
with the firm’s technological performance. 
 
3. Sample, Data and Methods  
Sample and Data. We collected panel data (1998–2007) on patents, financial 
information, CVC investments, and technology alliances of the five to ten top market leaders in 
the European Union across a broad spectrum of industries in manufacturing and selected 
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technology-intensive services sectors (telecommunications and IT services). Among the 250 
identified leading firms, 165 firms applied for at least one patent during the period and had 
financial information available. Among these 165 firms, only 55 firms engaged in CVC 
investments during the observation period, since CVC investments tend to be scarce in smaller 
firms (e.g., van de Vrande, 2013). As we are interested in the effects of CVC portfolio 
characteristics, our analysis focuses on these 55 firms, but we control for potential sample 
selection bias in the analyses. 
The 55 firms are based in the US (15), Germany (6), France (4), the UK (7), and Japan 
(8) as well as in small and internationalized economies such as The Netherlands, Finland, 
Switzerland, and Sweden. The firms operate in a range of industries such as Food & Tobacco 
(5), Paper and Printing (3), Chemicals and Pharma (10), Machinery (7), Electronics and 
Computer Equipment (12), Communications and Business Services (8), and Transportation 
Equipment and other industries (10). 
Patent data were retrieved from the PATSTAT database and consist of patent applications 
with the European Patent Office. Given that the sample firms are major market players in 
European industries, they will have strong incentives to apply for protection of their inventions 
and technologies in Europe. In order to identify all patent applications by the firms, we used 
yearly information in consolidated accounts and information in annual reports on majority-
owned affiliates. The 55 sample firms applied for 143,280 patents during the period 2001–2007 
(the observation period on the dependent variable).  
CVC information was retrieved from Thomson Financial’s VentureXpert database, which 
combines information from industry associations (e.g., the European Venture Capital 
Association, the National Venture Capital Association) and the investment banking community. 
These data have been used in a range of prior studies (e.g., Gompers, 1995; Dushnitsky and 
Lenox, 2005; Dushnitsky and Lavie, 2010). We identified over a thousand unique CVC 
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investments made by the sample firms for the period 1998–2007, where we focused only on the 
first investment of the firm in each venture. We retrieved data on the location of the ventures, the 
SIC codes, and the development stages of the ventures.  
We used Thomson’s SDC Platinum database as well as the MERIT-CATI database to 
gather information about the alliance activities of the sample firms. It is well known that these 
sources of alliance data overlap only modestly (Schilling, 2009). Therefore, combining 
complementary alliance information from the two databases strongly improves the accuracy of 
the alliance variables. We included only those alliances for which we had explicit information 
that technology development and technology-sharing were among the alliance objectives. 
Technology alliances on average make up about 15 percent of total alliances in the SDC database 
and 85 percent of the MERIT-CATI database. We identified some 1,544 technology alliances 
undertaken by the sample firms during the observation period. 
CVC investments and technology alliances are distinguished by SIC (SDC and 
VentureExpert) or technology field (CATI data). We map these SIC codes and technology fields 
into standard technology fields based on the concordance between World Intellectual Property 
Office (WIPO) technology classes and industries developed in Schmoch (2008). 
Our primary source of financial data was Compustat global and North America 
subsections. As Compustat has less than full coverage of European firms, we augmented these 
data with information retrieved from Worldscope and firms’ annual reports. With regard to R&D 
data, we additionally drew on the European R&D Scoreboard, which ranks European and non-
European firms by R&D expenditures. We used exchange rate information from IMF Financial 
Statistics to represent figures that were reported in domestic currencies in US dollars. 
The data construction exercise provided us with a balanced panel data set of firms’ 
technological performance, R&D, and alliance and CVC activities for the years 1998–2007. 
Given that the technology alliance and CVC variables are measured in terms of portfolios over 
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the past 3 years, the panel for estimation is restricted to 2001–2007 and includes 385 firm-year 
observations for the 55 firms.3 
Dependent variable – technological performance.  Following prior research on the 
technological performance implications of alliance and CVC activities (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 
2005; Wadhwa and Kotha, 2006; Sampson, 2007; Keil et al., 2008; Wadhwa et al., 2015), we use 
the number of patents of the firm in a year as our technological performance measure. There are 
numerous advantages of using patent counts as measures of technological activities (Basberg, 
1987; Griliches, 1990). Patent data are available in a consistent and longitudinal manner and 
provide ‘objective’ information in the sense that patents have been processed and validated by 
patent examiners based on novelty and utility of use. In line with previous studies, we used the 
patent application date as the first indication of a new capability or invention (e.g., Schmookler, 
1966; Sampson, 2007). Our analysis controls for industry and firm-specific differences in the 
propensity to patent. 
Independent variables. In constructing firms’ CVC portfolios, we treat all CVC 
investments made by a focal firm within a three-year window as constituting its CVC portfolio. 
Since CVC investments have been found to affect innovativeness for about three to four years 
following the investment activity (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005; Wadhwa et al., 2015), we relate 
technological performance to CVC investments and their characteristics during the prior three 
years. In this respect, we follow the standard approach taken in the alliance literature (e.g. Gulati, 
1995; Lavie and Miller, 2008). We construct firm portfolio variables through summation over 
individual CVC investments. We distinguish CVC investments by the geographic origin of the 
targets and compute the geographic diversity of the CVC investments, ܦ஼௏ as 1 over the 
Herfindahl concentration index of the CVC targets’ countries of origin (e.g., Goerzen and 
                                                 
3 For CVC investments and technology alliances we extended the period to include 1995–1998 to allow testing for 
experience effects. 
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Beamish, 2005). Formally this can be expressed as: ܦ஼௏ ൌ 1 ∑ ൣ∑ ܿݒ௝,௧ ܥ ௧ܸ⁄௧ିଵ௧ିଷ ൧௝∈௅ሺ௧ሻ ଶ⁄  where 
cvj,t refers to the number of CVC investments of the focal firm in country j at time t, L is the total 
number of CVC target countries, and CV is the total number of CVC investments. This diversity 
index, CVC geographic diversity, is the inverse of the Herfindahl index of concentration. The 
inverse of the Herfindahl index is also referred to as the ‘number equivalent’ of the Herfindahl 
index: it is the number of countries with CVC investments implied by the Herfindahl index if 
each country had an equal share of CVC investments. It varies between 1 (concentration of 
activities in one country) and the theoretical maximum equal to the total number of countries 
represented in the portfolio. It has the advantage that a unit change is more easily interpretable as 
the extension of geographic scope by one country with an equal share in CVC investments.  We 
also include the square term since Hypothesis 1 predicts an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between the geographic diversity of CVC investments and technological performance. 
 Technology alliance geographic diversity is measured in the same manner as CVC 
geographic diversity.  In order to test hypothesis 2, we include the interaction terms of 
technology alliance geographic diversity with the linear and square terms of CVC geographic 
diversity. Hypothesis 2 predicts a weakening of the inverted-U shaped relationship between 
technological performance and CVC geographic diversity at higher levels of technology alliance 
geographic diversity, implying both a flattening and a leftward shift of the curve.  
Knowledge Redundancy (hypothesis 3) is the degree to which the geographic pattern of 
technology alliances in a specific technology reduces the unique contribution of geographic 
diversity of the CVC portfolio of a firm in that technology. This is operationalized as the 
geographic overlap in CVC activities and technology alliances within the same technological 
field. We computed the extent of co-location between a firm’s CVC investment targets and its 
technological alliance partners within the same technology fields using uncentered correlation 
(cf. Sampson, 2007, Ahuja and Katila, 2001). To construct this variable we first generate the 
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distribution of each firm’s CVC investment targets and alliance partners across countries and 
technologies, year by year. This distribution is captured by the vectors ܥܸ ൌ ሺܥܸଵଵ, . . , ܥܸ௞௝ሻ and 
ܶܣ ൌ ሺܶܣଵଵ, . . , ܶܣ௞௝ሻ. The elements CVkj and TAkj of the vectors CV and TA represent the number 
of CVC investment targets and alliance partners, respectively, from t-1 through t-3, of the focal 
firm ݅	that are located in country k and technological class j. The extent of co-location between 
CVC and alliance activities is then: ܴ ൌ ܥ ௜ܸܶܣ௜ᇱ/ඥሺܥ ௜ܸܥ ௜ܸᇱሻሺܶܣ௜ܶܣ௜ᇱሻ. This overlap or 
geographic knowledge redundancy measure ranges from 0, signifying no redundancy, to 1, 
signifying complete redundancy, with the latter implying that all of the focal firm’s alliance 
partners and CVC targets in each technology field are located in the same countries. Hypothesis 
3 suggests a negative effect. 
Control variables. We include the square term of geographic diversity of technology 
alliances to allow for diseconomies of scope in knowledge sourcing through technology 
alliances. Since we are interested in testing for the influences of complexity due to simultaneous 
increases in CVC investments and alliances, it is important to control for a potentially declining 
marginal impact of increasing diversity in each of the technology sourcing modes.   
We control for firms’ host country alliance experience, gained through prior alliance 
activity in a country. The alliance experience variable is constructed as geographic overlap in 
past technology alliances and subsequent alliances, indicating the presence of relevant country 
experience. Using the proximity measure described above, we computed for each firm in our 
sample the extent of co-location between its technological alliance partners in years t-4 through 
t-6 and its alliances in years t-1 through t-3. Similarly, the variable host country CVC experience 
is constructed as the geographic overlap between CVC investments in years t-4 through t-6 and 
CVC investments in years t-1 through t-3. 
We also control for technological relatedness between the ventures and the investing 
firm’s existing knowledge base, to reflect that technology sourcing through CVCs may be more 
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effective if relatedness ensures a stronger absorptive capacity (e.g. Zahra and Hayton, 2008). We 
determine whether the technology of the ventures is available in the technology portfolio of the 
investor and measure CVC technological relatedness as the share of CVC investments that 
overlap with the firm’s existing technology (patent) portfolio. We also include the square term of 
this variable to allow for possible nonlinear effects of technological relatedness.  
We include a set of controls to ensure that the variables related to geographic diversity 
indeed measure the impact of such diversity and do not reflect the influences of other factors 
such as technology diversity, other sourcing strategies, or the simple scale of technology-
sourcing activities. We defined the variables technological diversity (CVC) as the number of 
unique technology classes of a focal firm’s CVC investment portfolio and technological diversity 
(alliances) as the number of unique technology classes of the firm’s technology alliances, as a 
proportion of the total number of CVC targets and technology alliances, respectively. These 
variables control for the potential positive effect of a wider technological scope of technology-
search strategies (e.g. Wadhwa et al., 2015). To help isolate the effects of geographic redundancy 
we also control for the overlap in technology fields covered by both CVC investments and 
technology alliances (technology overlap CVC and alliances) by calculating the uncentered 
correlation between technological classes of a focal firm’s CVC investment portfolio and those 
of the technology alliances. 
In order to control for other potential knowledge-sourcing and knowledge-integration 
strategies, we add the technological diversity of M&As as the number of unique technology fields 
in which M&A targets of the firms are active. We take a two-year portfolio of M&As identified 
in SDC and the Zephyr database. M&As are assumed to be technology-based or (partially) 
motivated by technology-sourcing if a target firm holds patents or if a target firm is active in 
technology alliances (e.g. Belderbos et al., 2011). We also control for the size of the technology-
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sourcing portfolios by including the overall number of CVC investments, technology alliances, 
and M&As (portfolio size) in which a firm is engaged.  
The models include variables controlling for characteristics of the CVC portfolio other 
than those related to geographic and technological diversity. CVC portfolio maturity may have a 
general effect on the knowledge sourcing potential of CVC investments. It is measured as the 
average stage of investments in a firm’s CVC portfolio (e.g. Wadhwa et al., 2010), treating 
startup/seed, early stage, expansion, or late stage as an ordinal scale and calculating the average. 
Since CVC investments may differ in the extent to which they are focusing on knowledge 
sourcing and exploration on the one hand, or knowledge exploitation and commercialization on 
the other, the models include a control for potential exploitation motives. Since an exploitation 
focus is more likely to be prominent if CVC investments are targeting markets in which the firm 
has important sales and marketing operations, we take into account the extent to which CVC 
investments overlap with the distribution of the firm’s global sales. We collected data on the 
regional sales profile of the investing firms and created the variable CVC market focus, measured 
as the share of global sales in regions in which the firm has CVC investments. As we have no 
prior on the functional form, we use a more general specification and also include the square 
term of the CVC market focus variable.  
We further control for time-varying firm-level factors that are likely to affect 
technological performance: the value of R&D expenditures (in natural logarithm), firm size (the 
logarithm of firm sales), a firm’s leverage, and slack. The latter, defined as the ratio of current 
assets to liabilities, is used to control for the availability of short-term liquidity. Inter-temporal 
trends in technological performance are controlled for by year dummies. Finally, unspecified 
unobserved heterogeneity in firm-level technological performance due to, for instance, general 
managerial capabilities or different propensities to patent, is controlled for by estimating pseudo–
fixed effects models (see below).  
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 Methods. The empirical models relate the technological performance measured by the 
number of patent applications of a firm in a given year to the firm’s prior CVC and technology 
alliance activities.  The dependent variable is a count variable with only non-negative integer 
values. In this case, nonlinear count data models, such as Negative Binomial or Poisson models, 
are preferred over standard linear regression models, as they explicitly take into account the non-
negativity and discreteness of the dependent variable. We tested whether the assumption of the 
Poisson model that the variance of the dependent variable equals its mean holds (e.g., Cameron 
and Trivedi, 1998). The test rejected the null that the dispersion parameter alpha was equal to 
zero (p-value = 0.00), and hence we employ the negative binomial regression models that allow 
for over-dispersion. We report the values of the over-dispersion parameter for our models in 
Table 2. 
We estimate models using a pseudo–fixed effect estimator for count data due to Blundell 
et al., (1999). In this model, firm fixed effects are captured by the average value of the pre-
sample observations of the dependent variable (the number of patents), which then enters the 
model as an additional explanatory variable. The pseudo fixed effects model controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity and  has a number of additional advantages in the context of our 
research. Unlike  random- or fixed-effects estimators, the pseudo fixed effects estimator does not 
rely on a strict exogeneity assumption regarding the explanatory variables (Blundell et al., 1999). 
This assumption would be violated if, for instance, an unobserved change in a firm’s managerial 
abilities increases both its current knowledge-sourcing efforts and future patenting rates.4 The 
pseudo fixed effects model also is more parsimonious compared with a fixed effects model given 
that it requires the estimation of only one coefficient, and, unlike negative binomial fixed or 
random effects estimators,  allows for estimation of cluster-robust standard errors. 
                                                 
4 Technically speaking, the pseudo fixed effects estimator remains consistent, as it requires explanatory variables 
only to be pre-determined, not strictly exogenous. 
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To address potential sample selection concerns due to our focus on 55 CVC-active firms 
from an initial larger set of firms, we implemented a two-stage approach that corrects for 
selection effects. We first estimated a first-stage probit model that explains firms’ propensity to 
engage in CVC investments and subsequently include the Inverse Mill’s ratio as an additional 
covariate in the technological performance models (e.g. Certo et al., 2016; Hass and Hansen, 
2004). In the first-stage model we use the following instruments which prior research (e.g.  Basu 
et al. 2011; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005) has identified as strong predictors of firms’ propensity to 
engage in CVC: firms’ technological resources (the log of the number of patents in the last 5 
years), technological diversity of alliances (the number of technological fields entered through 
alliances, scaled by the number of alliances), and technological diversity of M&As (the number 
of technological fields entered through M&As scaled by the number of M&As). In addition, we 
include firm alliances (the count of the technological alliances in the past 3 years), firm 
acquisitions (the number of technological acquisitions in the past 2 years), geographic sales 
diversification (the Blau index of the distribution of firms’ sales across regions), firm liquidity 
(the ratio of current assets to current liabilities), firm size (total revenues), firm age (the number 
of years since founding), firm R&D stock (computed using the perpetual inventory method), the 
ratio of administrative and general expense to sales, and sets of industry, country, and year 
dummies. The first stage model is highly significant, with technological resources and the 
technological diversity of alliances as strong predictors of firms’ decision to engage in CVC 
investments. Consistent with Basu et al. (2011) and Dushnitsky & Lenox (2005) we find that 
firm size, liquidity, and the number of prior alliances are also positively related to the propensity 
to engage in CVC investments.  
 
  
24 
 
4. Empirical results 
 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. The sample firms on average apply for 372 patents 
per year, with a standard deviation of 440. The average geographic diversity of CVC investments 
is relatively small at 1.38 (standard deviation 0.56), while it is higher for technology alliances, at 
2.49 (standard deviation 1.74). The geographic overlap at the technology level between CVC 
investments and technology alliance activities (knowledge redundancy) is relatively low: 0.05 on 
a 0–1 scale, with a standard deviation of 0.09. In addition, we can report that among firms 
engaging in alliances and CVC investments, the average technology alliance portfolio consists of 
19 alliances, while the average CVC portfolio consists of 14 investments. The largest portfolios 
of alliances and CVC investments in our sample count 81 alliances and 100 CVC investments, 
respectively. Correlations are moderate in most cases and do not raise multicollinearity concerns. 
Higher correlations are naturally observed between the pre-sample mean and technological 
performance, and between the linear and square terms of variables. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Table 2 reports the empirical results of the pseudo–fixed effects Negative Binomial 
models. Model I includes only the control variables and serves as a point of comparison for the 
other models in which we sequentially add the hypothesis-testing variables. The final model (V) 
includes all variables. Model I shows the expected positive and significant (ߚ ൌ 0.002, ݌ ൌ
0.000ሻ	influence of the pre-sample dependent variable (the pseudo fixed effect), in addition to a 
significantly positive effect of R&D investments	ሺߚ ൌ 0.374, ݌ ൌ 0.000ሻ. Firm size is also 
positively related to technological performance	ሺߚ ൌ 0.098, ݌ ൌ 0.009ሻ and leverage has a 
negative association	ሺߚ ൌ െ0.007, ݌ ൌ 0.000ሻ.  
The size of the combined knowledge sourcing portfolio is insignificant but gains 
marginal significance with a negative sign in the more encompassing models. The technological 
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diversity of technology alliances is positive and significant	ሺߚ ൌ 0.699, ݌ ൌ 0.003ሻ, but the 
variables controlling for the degree of technological diversity of the CVC investment portfolio 
and technological diversity of M&As are not. The latter may be partially related to the post-
acquisition integration difficulties of less related acquisitions (e.g., Hennart and Reddy, 1997; 
Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Belderbos et al., 2011). The variable measuring prior CVC country 
experience is significant and has a positive sign	ሺߚ ൌ 0.235, ݌ ൌ 0.043ሻ. The effect of 
geographic diversity of alliances is insignificant in model 1 but becomes positive and significant 
in the more encompassing models, in line with prior findings in the literature (e.g., Lavie and 
Miller, 2008). 
Technological relatedness between the CVC investments and firms’ existing 
technological expertise appears to have a weak inverted-U shaped relationship with 
technological performance in model 1, but this effect disappears in the more encompassing 
models. Technology overlap in CVC and technology alliance portfolios is significant (at the 10 
percent level) and negatively related to technological performance	ሺߚ ൌ െ0.407, ݌ ൌ 0.064ሻ, in 
line with the general argument on knowledge redundancy if firms pursue overlapping knowledge 
sourcing strategies simultaneously.  
The maturity of the CVC portfolio is also negatively associated with technological 
performance 	ሺߚ ൌ െ0.109, ݌ ൌ 0.006ሻ.	CVC market focus has a weakly significant	ሺߚଵ ൌ
0.763, ݌ ൌ 0.090; ߚଶ ൌ െ1.196, ݌ ൌ 0.018ሻ inverted-U shaped relationship with technological 
performance. The estimated coefficients suggest an initial positive effect of market focus, with 
the marginal effect turning negative at around the mean value (0.3). This may indicate that some 
familiarity with the locations in which CVC investments take place is positive for knowledge 
sourcing. On the other hand, geographic configurations of CVC investments that are closely 
aligned with existing sales locations are likely to reflect knowledge exploitation strategies, 
providing  limited learning potential for CVC investments and leading to reduced effects on 
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technological performance. The market focus effects are, however, not robust in the broader 
hypotheses testing models.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
When geographic diversity of CVC investments and its square term are added (model II) 
they suggest an inverted U-shaped relationship between CVC geographic diversity and 
technological performance	ሺߚଵ ൌ 0.435, ݌ ൌ 0.005ሻ, ሺߚଶ ൌ െ0.095, ݌ ൌ 0.012ሻ, in support of 
Hypothesis 1. Model III reveals a significantly negative coefficient for the interaction term 
between the geographic diversity of technology alliances ሺߚଵ ൌ െ0.228, ݌ ൌ 0.000ሻ and the 
linear term of geographic diversity of CVC investments, and a significantly positive coefficient 
for the interaction with the square term	ሺߚଶ ൌ െ0.042, ݌ ൌ 0.020ሻ. The resulting consequences 
for the relationship between the geographic diversity of CVC investments and predicted 
technological performance are illustrated in Figure 2. The graphs are drawn when the geographic 
diversity of technology alliances is taken, respectively, at the mean minus one standard deviation 
(‘low level’ of diversity) and at the mean plus one standard deviation (‘high level’ of diversity), 
keeping the values of all other variables at their sample mean. While geographic diversity of 
CVC investments can have substantial performance effects until the optimal level of diversity, at 
higher geographic diversity of technology alliances, the curve is flatter, the maximum 
performance effect is smaller, and this maximum is reached at a lower  level of CVC geographic 
diversity. These patterns are consistent with Hypothesis 2.5 
 
------------------------------- 
                                                 
5 We confirmed that that the expression	ሺߚଵߚସ െ ߚଶߚଷሻ 2ሺߚଶ ൅ ߚସܼሻଶ⁄ , with 	ߚଵ the coefficient on the linear term,	ߚଶ 
on the square term,	ߚଷ on the linear interaction and 	ߚସ on the squared interaction, respectively, is negative, in 
support of a shift of the curve to the left (Haans et al., 2016) - although the Wald test narrowly rejected significance 
of this expression. The sign and significance of ߚସ confirms a flattening of the curve. If an additional interaction 
term between the square terms of the geographic diversity of CVC investments and technology alliances is included, 
its coefficient is insignificant, while the empirical results do not change materially.  
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Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
The knowledge redundancy variable (geographic overlap between CVC investments and 
technology alliances), added to model IV, has a negative and significant (albeit at the 10 percent 
level) coefficient	ሺߚ ൌ െ0.895, ݌ ൌ 0.056ሻ, in support of Hypothesis 3. Calculations show that 
a standard deviation increase in redundancy from its mean value could reduce technological 
performance by 10 percent.  
Supplementary analysis. While our analysis controls for technological diversity of the 
knowledge sourcing strategies and the overlap in technologies pursued, we further investigated 
potential interrelationships between the geographic and technological dimensions of search. One 
possibility is that there is a tradeoff between the two dimensions, as firms with a narrow 
technology search strategy can more effectively pursue geographic diversity. To examine this 
question empirically, we included an interaction effect between CVC technology diversity and 
CVC geographic diversity. While the interaction term carried the expected negative sign, it was 
not significant in the model estimations.  
 We estimated models with an alternative dependent variable. Instead of patent counts we 
used the number of forward citations received by the firm’s patents in a four-year window 
subsequent to the patent application. While differences in forward citations are likely to reflect 
differences in the value of patents, Kim (2015) points out that forward citations not only pick up 
technological contribution and knowledge creation, but also reflect differences in appropriation 
and value-capture strategies - which are less directly related to our theory and tests. Estimation 
of models with forward citations as the dependent variable nevertheless produced highly 
comparable results. 
We examined potential endogeneity of our core explanatory variables by relaxing the 
assumption that the focal variables are predetermined. We estimated GMM models in which we 
instrumented geographic diversity in its linear form, complexity, and knowledge redundancy 
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with their lagged values (measured in the period t-4 through t-6). The GMM specifications 
produced similar results and the Hansen test did not reject the exogeneity of instruments.6 These 
indicative results, together with our use of pseudo–fixed effects models to control for unobserved 
firm heterogeneity, the control for selection effects, the elaborate set of time-variant firm 
variables, the adoption of lagged focal variables, and the focus on moderating effects and 
specific characteristics of CVC investments rather than on technology-sourcing strategies per se, 
mitigate concerns over potential endogeneity bias in our estimates due to selection, unobserved 
heterogeneity or reverse causality.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In today’s increasingly globalized world, established firms are adopting a globally 
dispersed knowledge-sourcing strategy through multiple modes, with CVC investments 
becoming a major recent addition to traditional external knowledge-sourcing strategies such as 
technology alliances. This raises questions concerning the benefits of pursuing a geographically 
diverse CVC-investment strategy but also about the tensions arising from the parallel pursuit of a 
geographically diverse technology alliance strategy. Firms may yet have to recognize these 
tensions properly given their more recent experience with CVC strategies. 
The current study addresses these concerns by examining why and when geographic 
diversity in CVC investments has (positive) consequences for firms’ technological performance 
in the context of simultaneously pursued technology alliance strategies. Anchoring our research 
in the literature on search, learning and innovation, we proposed that geographic diversity in 
CVC portfolios can enhance technological performance by allowing access to a broad array of 
firms and their networks that are embedded in local systems of innovation, each with their 
distinct knowledge bases and approaches and traditions to knowledge development. By 
                                                 
6 A lack of suitable instruments for models in which both the linear and squared terms of CVC geographic diversity 
are included prevented us from estimating full GMM variants of the models.  
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exploring new sources of knowledge in multiple locations, firms increase the breadth of 
knowledge elements available for recombination and cross-fertilization, thereby enhancing the 
effectiveness of their knowledge sourcing portfolios. As firms’ portfolios of CVC investments 
becomes more diverse, interactions with a more diverse set of partners in various countries is 
likely to increase the difficulties and costs of absorbing and recombining diverse knowledge 
elements, such that an inverted-U shaped relationship between the geographic diversity of CVC 
investments and technological performance is expected. 
We furthermore argued that the positive effect of geographic diversity is subject to 
important boundary conditions – in particular in the context of simultaneous engagement in 
technology alliances. First, high levels of diversity may diminish the effectiveness of CVC 
investment portfolios due to increasing managerial complexity, coordination costs, and resource 
constraints, and these issues are likely to be more pronounced if firms pursue geographic 
diversity in both technology alliances and CVC investments. Second, if technology alliances and 
CVC investments target similar locations, this can lead to knowledge redundancy due to the 
exploration of knowledge in the same innovation systems, reducing the efficiency of the overall 
knowledge sourcing portfolio. We found broad empirical support for these conjectures when 
relating technological performance to CVC investment and technology alliance portfolios for a 
panel of 55 CVC-active firms in a variety of industries. 
Our paper makes several contributions to the CVC literature. First, while prior literature 
has focused on the returns related to the size of knowledge-sourcing portfolios (e.g. Wadhwa and 
Kotha, 2006; van de Vrande et al., 2011) and technology diversity in CVC portfolios (Yang et 
al., 2014; Wadhwa et al., 2015; Matusik and Fitza, 2012), our research contributes to the CVC 
literature by highlighting the role of the geographic diversity of CVC investments. Our analysis 
goes beyond the general insight that international venturing is positively related to performance 
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(Zahra and Hayton, 2008). We highlight that it is the geographic diversity of international 
venturing that matters - an important dimension that has received little attention in prior research.  
Second, our paper contributes to the literature more generally by demonstrating that the 
performance effects of CVC investments depend on the broader portfolio of firms’ knowledge-
sourcing strategies (Dushnitsky and Lavie, 2010). Previous studies have typically juxtaposed 
various external knowledge-sourcing modes without examining specific complementarities or 
conflicts between modes (e.g. Keil et al., 2008; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; van de Vrande et al., 
2011; Wadhwa and Kotha, 2006; Wadhwa et al., 2015). In this respect, our study establishes 
salient interrelationships between CVC investments and technology alliances in firms’ efforts to 
improve innovation performance, suggesting that a lack of coordination at the portfolio level 
among multiple knowledge sourcing strategies can be detrimental to performance.  
More specifically, our findings suggest that redundancy, managerial complexity, and 
resource constraints occur across the portfolios of technology alliances and CVC investments 
and not only within the individual portfolios of either of these modes. In this respect, our 
research provides more detailed evidence for the more general notion put forward in Dushnitsky 
and Lavie (2010) that potential redundancy and resource constraints influence optimal 
combinations of CVC investments and technology alliances. Our research ‘unpacks’ these 
conflicts by identifying overlaps in the geographic sources of knowledge and of specific 
technologies as the causes of redundancy, and we identify the combination of sourcing-mode 
diversity and geographic diversity as the most salient influence on complexity.  
We note that our findings on conflicts in portfolios that combine technology alliances 
with CVC investments should not be interpreted as identifying a general lack of complementarity 
between alliances and CVC investments. First, technology alliances and CVC investments 
complement each other if portfolios are structured to avoid redundancy and complexity. Second, 
it should be emphasized that our analysis focused on a narrow set of alliances characterized by 
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knowledge creation and knowledge sourcing objectives - in line with our research questions and 
dependent variable. Such technology alliances are most likely to be similar in their objectives to 
CVC investments—in particular, early-stage CVC investments. While this is instrumental for 
properly identifying alliance–CVC interactions in knowledge-sourcing, it can be safely assumed 
that alliances with other objectives (e.g., those focused on marketing and distribution) have a 
clearer complementary relationship with CVC activities.  
The notion of broader objectives of alliances also relates to another feature of our 
research: we examined the consequences for technological performance of simultaneously 
pursuing diversified technology-sourcing strategies, but abstained from exploring more complex 
patterns of intertemporal relationships between such strategies. The relatively short time span for 
which we gathered our data and the difficulties associated with identifying simultaneous as well 
as intertemporal interactions between complex portfolios prevented us from pursuing this. Prior 
studies have for instance suggested that intertemporal stability in strategies may enhance 
performance (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002; Shi and Prescott, 2011; Shi et al., 2012; Belderbos 
et al., 2015). An interesting avenue for future research would be to examine whether a 
sequential, rather than concurrent, balance in sourcing strategies has positive performance 
consequences. For instance, CVC investments may be a precursor to alliance strategies (Sykes, 
1990; van de Vrande and Vanhaverbeke, 2013), while participation in strategic alliances in turn 
may make a firm both a more attractive partner for CVC target firms and help identify potential 
local CVC targets (Dushnitsky and Lavie, 2010).  
 One of the limitations of our research is that our theorizing focused on a substantive 
theory of CVC investments (e.g. Burgelman, 2011; Basu et al., 2015). Hence, our aim has been 
to better understand the consequences of the observed phenomenon of the internationalization of 
CVC investment portfolios in conjunction with firms’ technology alliance activities, but not to 
develop a general theory of search and organizational learning through CVC investments. 
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Another limitation is our conceptualization of technology alliances and CVC investments as 
similar instruments of overseas knowledge sourcing–controlling for other potential 
considerations behind CVC investments. However, CVC investments and technology alliances 
may have differential advantages in different international settings due to, for example, 
geographical variations in the availability of venture and alliance partners and firms’ ability to 
attract these partners. Further research may adopt a broader focus and include considerations of 
when and where one mode of knowledge sourcing may be more efficient than the other. Such 
endeavors would also take into account other types of heterogeneity in CVC investments related 
to, for instance, the nature of investor involvement (e.g. Wadhwa and Kotha, 2006), and 
potential strategic goals related to the leveraging of existing technologies (Yang et al., 2014; 
Keil, 2004).  
Finally, our study could not take into account potential organizational moderators of the 
performance effects of CVC investments in the context of broader knowledge-sourcing 
portfolios. Firms may treat CVC investments and alliances as distinct activities (Kale et al., 
2002) managed rather independently by different personnel and units. While this may mitigate 
issues related to managerial complexity, it may also imply that tradeoffs are not easily 
recognized or acted upon. An unanswered question pertains to the role that dedicated 
organizational units managing CVC investments (e.g. Hill and Birkinshaw, 2015) and 
technology alliances (e.g. Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kale et al., 2002; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005; 
Sarkar et al., 2009; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010) could play in addressing managerial 
complexities and knowledge redundancies that arise from diversified portfolios of alliances and 
CVC investments. A CVC unit, owing to its semi-autonomous character, may perhaps be well 
placed to perform the role of integrating its knowledge-sourcing strategy with the overall 
knowledge-development strategy of the parent firm. Corporate alliance units, although often 
falling under the direct responsibility of top management, may perform a similar function in 
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regard to alliances. It will be interesting, therefore, to explore in future work how dedicated 
alliance and CVC units interact to potentially attenuate the tradeoffs between technology 
alliances and CVC investments. 
 
REFERENCES 
Ahuja, G., & Katila, R. 2001. Technological acquisitions and the innovation performance of 
acquiring firms: A longitudinal study. Strategic Management Journal 22 197–220.  
Ahuja, G., & Katila, R. 2004. Where do resources come from? The role of situations. Strategic 
Management Journal, 25(8-9) 887-907. 
Ahuja, G., & Lampert, C. M. 2001. Entrepreneurship in a large corporation: A longitudinal study 
of how established firms create breakthrough inventions. Strategic Management Journal, 
22: 521-543. 
Allen, S. A. & Hevert, K. T., 2007. Venture capital investing by information technology 
companies: Did it pay? Journal of Business Venturing, 22(2): 262–282. 
Almeida, P., Song, J., & Grant, R. M. 2002. Are firms superior to alliances and markets? An 
empirical test of cross-border knowledge building. Organization Science, 13(2), 147-161. 
Anderson, P., 1999. Perspective: Complexity theory and organization science. Organization 
science, 10(3), pp.216-232. 
Arora, A., & Gambardella, A. 1994. Evaluating technological information and utilizing it: 
Scientiﬁc knowledge, technological capability, and external linkages in biotechnology. 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 24(1): 91–115. 
Basberg, B. L. 1987. Patents and the measurement of technological change: A survey of the 
literature. Research policy, 16(2): 131-141. 
Basu, S., Phelps, C., & Kotha, S. 2011. Towards understanding who makes corporate venture 
capital investments and why. Journal of Business Venturing, 26(2): 153-171. 
Belderbos, R., Lokshin, B. & Sadowski, B. 2015. The Returns to Foreign R&D, Journal of 
International Business Studies 46 (4), 491-504. 
Belderbos, R., Carree, M., Fernández Sastre, J., Lokshin, B. 2015.  Inter-temporal patterns of 
R&D Collaboration and Innovative Performance, Journal of Technology Transfer 40 (1): 
123-137. 
 
34 
 
Belderbos, R., Jacob, J., & Lokshin, B. 2011. Geographic diversity and the effects of M&As and 
technology alliances on innovative performance, paper presented at the DIME conference, 
UNU-MERIT, Maastricht, April 2011. 
Belderbos, R. A., & Zou, J. 2009. Real options and foreign affiliate divestments: A portfolio 
perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 40: 600-620 
Blundell, R., R. Griffith, J. van Reenen. 1999. Market share, market value and innovation in a  
panel of British manufacturing firms. Review of Economic Studies, 66(3) 529–554. 
Burgelman, R.A., 2011. Bridging history and reductionism: A key role for longitudinal 
qualitative research. Journal of International Business Studies, 42(5), pp.591-601. 
Cameron, C & P. Trivedi 1998. Regression Analysis of Count Data, Cambridge University Press 
Chesbrough, H., 2002. Making Sense of Corporate Venture Capital. Harvard Business Review. 
Chesbrough, H. W., & Tucci, C. L.  2004. Corporate venture capital in the context of corporate 
innovation, Working paper, Haas School of Business, UC-Berkeley (2004) 
Chung, W., & Yeaple, S. 2008. International knowledge sourcing: Evidence from U.S. firms 
expanding abroad. Strategic Management Journal, 29(11): 1207-1224. 
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. 1990. Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and 
innovation. Administrative science quarterly, 128-152. 
Daft, R. L., & Lengel, R. 1986. Organizational information requirements, media richness, and 
structural design. Management Science, 32: 554–571. 
Das, T. K., & Teng, B. 2000. A resource-based theory of strategic alliances. Journal of 
Management, 26: 31-61. 
Davis, J. P., & Eisenhardt, K. M. 2011. Rotating leadership and collaborative innovation 
recombination processes in symbiotic relationships. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
56(2), 159-201. 
Dess, G.G. and Beard, D.W., 1984. Dimensions of organizational task environments. 
Administrative science quarterly, pp.52-73. 
Dushnitsky, G., & Lavie, D. 2010. How alliance formation shapes corporate venture capital 
investment in the software industry: A resource-based perspective. Strategic 
Entrepreneurship Journal, 4(1): 22-48. 
Dushnitsky, G. 2006. Corporate venture capital: Past evidence and future directions. Oxford 
handbook of entrepreneurship, 387-431. 
Dushnitsky, G. 2011. Riding the next wave of corporate venture captial. Business Strategy 
Review, 22(3), 44-49. 
35 
 
Dushnitsky, G., & Lenox, M. J. 2006. When Does Corporate Venture Capital Investment Create 
Firm Value? Journal of Business Venturing, 21(6):753-772. 
Dushnitsky, G., & Lenox, M. J. 2005. When do incumbents learn from entrepreneurial ventures? 
Research Policy, 34(5): 615-639. 
Dyer, J.H., &, Singh, H.  1998.  The relational view:  Cooperative strategy and sources of 
interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23: 660-679. 
Fleming, L., 2001. Recombinant uncertainty in technological search. Management science, 
47(1), pp.117-132. 
Foss, N.J., J. Lyngsie and S.A. Zahra 2013. The role of External Knowledge Sources and 
Organizational Design in the Process of Opportunity Exploitation, Strategic Management 
Journal (DOI: 10. 1002/smj.2135) 
Furman, J. L., Porter, M. E., & Stern, S. 2002. The determinants of national innovative capacity. 
Research policy, 31(6), 899-933. 
Goerzen, A., & Beamish, P. W. 2005. The effect of alliance network diversity on multinational 
enterprise performance. Strategic Management Journal, 26: 333–354. 
Gompers, P. 1995. Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture capital.  Journal 
of Finance, 50(5): 1461–1491. 
Griliches, Z. 1990. Patent  statistics as economic indicators: A survey. Journal of Economic 
Literature 28: 1661-1707. 
Gulati, R. 1995. Familiarity breeds trust? The implications of repeated ties on contractual choice 
in alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 38: 85-112. 
Gulati, R., & Singh, H. 1998. The architecture of cooperation: Managing coordination costs and 
appropriation concerns in strategic alliances. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43(4): 781–
814.  
Gupta, A. K., & Sapienza, H. J. 1992. Determinants of venture capital firms' preferences 
regarding the industry diversity and geographic scope of their investments. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 7(5), 347-362.  
Hamel, G., Doz, Y.L. and Prahalad, C.K., 1989. Collaborate with your competitors and win. 
Harvard business review, 67(1), pp.133-139. 
Haans, R. F. J., Pieters, C. and He, Z.-L. 2016. Thinking about U: Theorizing and testing U- and 
inverted U-shaped relationships in strategy research. Strategic Management Journal, (7), 
1177–1195. 
36 
 
Haas, M and M. Hansen 2005. When using knowledge can hurt performance: The value of 
organizational capabilities in a management consulting company, Strategic Management 
Journal 26: 1-24. 
Henderson, J., & B. Leleux. 2002. Corporate venture capital: Effecting resource combinations 
and transfers. Babson Entrepreneurial Review, (October): 31–46. 
Hennart, J. F., & Reddy, S. 1997. The choice between mergers/acquisitions and joint ventures: 
the case of Japanese investors in the United States. Strategic Management Journal 18 1–
12.  
Hilbe, J. 2011. Negative Binomial Regression. Cambridge University Press.    
Hill, S. A., & Birkinshaw, J. 2015. Ambidexterity and survival in corporate venture units. 
Journal of Management, 40 (7): 1899-1931. 
Hoang, H. T., & Rothaermel, F. T. 2005. The effect of general and partner-specific alliance 
experience on joint R&D project performance. Academy of Management Journal, 48(2) 
332-345.  
Hoetker, G., & Agarwal, R. 2004. Death hurts, but it isn’t fatal: The post-exit diffusion of 
knowledge created by innovative companies. UIUC working paper. 
Hoffmann, W. H. 2007. Strategies for managing a portfolio of alliances. Strategic Management 
Journal, 28: 827–56. 
Hurry, D., Miller, A.T., & Bowman, E. H. 1992. Calls on high-technology: Japanese exploration 
of venture capital investments in the United States. Strategic Management Journal, 13: 85-
101. 
Jaffe, A.B., Trajtenberg, M., & Henderson, R. 1993. Geographic localization of knowledge 
spillovers as evidenced by patent citations. Quart. J. Econom., 108: 577-598. 
Katila, R., & Ahuja, G. 2002. Something old, something new: A longitudinal study of search 
behavior and new product introduction. Academy of management journal, 45(6), 1183-
1194. 
Kale, P., Dyer, J., &  Singh, H. 2002. Alliance capability, stock market response and long-term 
alliance success: The role of the alliance function. Strategic Management Journal, 23: 747-
767. 
Keil, T. 2004. Building external corporate venturing capability: Initial conditions, learning 
processes and knowledge management. Journal of Management Studies, 41(5): 799–825. 
Keil, T., Maula, M.,  Schildt, H., & Zahra, S.A. 2008. The effect of governance modes and 
relatedness of external business development activities on innovative performance. 
Strategic Management Journal, 29: 895–907. 
37 
 
Kim, M. 2015. Geographic scope, isolating mechanisms, and value appropriation, Strategic 
Management Journal, 37 (4): 623–815.  
Kogut, B., & Zander, U. 1992. Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the 
replication of technology. Organization science, 3(3), 383-397. 
Lahiri, N. 2010. Geographic distribution of R&D activity: How does it affect innovation quality. 
Academy of Management Journal, 53 (5): 1194-1200. 
Laursen, K., & Salter, A. 2006. Open for innovation: the role of openness in explaining 
innovation performance among UK manufacturing firms. Strategic management journal, 
27(2), 131-150. 
Lavie, D., & Miller, S.R., 2008. Alliance portfolio internationalization and firm performance. 
Organization Science, 19(4): 623-646. 
Lavie, D., Kang, J., & Rosenkopf, L. 2011. Balance within and across domains: The 
performance implications of exploration and exploitation in alliances. Organization 
Science, 22(6), 1517-1538. 
Leiponen, A., & Helfat, E. 2011. Location, Decentralization and Knowledge Sources for 
Innovation, Organization Science, 22(3): 641-658. 
Leten, B., Belderbos, R., Van Looy, B. 2016. Entry and Performance in New Technology 
Domains, Journal of Management Studies 53 (8): 1257–1291. 
Levinthal D.A., March,  J.G., 1993.  The myopia of learning.  Strategic Management Journal, 
Winter Special Issue 14:  95-112.  
MacMillan, I., E. Roberts, V. Livada, A. Wang. 2008. Corporate venture capital (CVC): Seeking 
innovation and strategic growth. National Institute of Standards and Technology-US 
Department of Commerce 08-916. 
Matusik, S.F. and Fitza. M.A 2012. Diversification in the Venture Capital Industry: Leveraging 
Knowledge under Uncertainty. Strategic Management Journal, 33: 407-426 
Mitchell, W. 1989. Whether and when: Probability and timing of incumbents entry into 
emerging industrial subﬁelds. Administrative Science Quarterly, 34(2): 208–230. 
Narayanan, V. K., Yang, Y., & Zahra, S. A. 2009. Corporate venturing and value creation: a 
review and proposed framework. Research Policy, 38(1), 58-76. 
North, D. 1990. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Novick, L. R. 1988. Analogical transfer, problem similarity, and expertise. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 14(3), 510. 
38 
 
Parkhe, A. 1993. Partner nationality and the structure-performance relationship in strategic 
alliances. Organization Science, 4(2): 301-324.  
Phene, A., Fladmoe-Lindquist, K. and Marsh, L. 2006. Breakthrough innovations in the U.S. 
biotechnology industry: the effects of technological space and geographic origin. Strategic 
Management Journal, 27, 369-388. 
Porter, M. E. 1990. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. Free Press, New York. 
Rosenkopf, L., & Almeida, P. 2003. Overcoming local search through alliances and mobility. 
Management science, 49(6), 751-766. 
Rosenkopf, L., & Nerkar, A. 2001. Beyond local search: boundary‐spanning, exploration, and 
impact in the optical disk industry. Strategic Management Journal, 22(4), 287-306. 
Rothaermel, F.T., & Hess, A. M. 2007. Building   dynamic capabilities: Innovation driven by 
individual-, ﬁrm-, and network-level effects. Organization Science, 18(6) 898–921. 
Sampson, R. C. 2007. R&D alliances and firm performance: The impact of technological 
diversity and alliance organization on innovation. Academy of Management Journal, 50(2): 
364-386. 
Sarkar, M. B., Aulakh, P. S., & Madhok, A.2009. Process capabilities and value generation in 
alliance portfolios. Organization Science, 20(3), 583-600. 
Saxenian, A. 1994. Regional Advantage. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Schilling, M.A., 2009. Understanding the alliance data. Strategic Management Journal, 30(3), 
pp.233-260. 
Schmoch, U. 2008. Concept of a technology classification for country comparisons. Final Report 
to the World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO), Karslruhe: Fraunhofer ISI. 
Schilke, O., & Goerzen, A. 2010. Alliance management capability: An investigation of the 
construct and its measurement.  Journal of Management, 36: 1192-1219. 
Schmookler, J. 1966.  Invention and Economic Growth. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
Shi, W., & Prescott, J. E. 2011. Sequence patterns of firms’ acquisition and alliance behavior and 
their performance implications. Journal of Management Studies, 48: 1044-1070. 
Shi, W., Sun, J., & Prescott, J. E. 2012. A temporal perspective of merger and acquisition and 
strategic alliance initiatives: Review and future direction. Journal of Management, 38(1): 
164-209. 
Song, J., Almeida, P., & Wu, G. 2003. Learning-by-hiring: When is mobility more likely to 
facilitate interfirm knowledge transfer? Management Science, 49(4):  351-365 
39 
 
Stettner, U., & Lavie, D. 2014. Ambidexterity under scrutiny: Exploration and exploitation via 
internal organization, alliances, and acquisitions. Strategic management journal, 35(13), 
1903-1929. 
Sykes, H. 1990. Corporate venture capital: Strategies for success. Journal of Business 
Venturing. 5(1): 37-47.  
Terza 1998. Estimating Count Data Models with Endogenous Switching: Sample Selection and 
Endogenous Treatment Effects, Journal of Econometrics, 84: 129-154.  
van de Vrande, V. 2013. Balancing your technology-sourcing portfolio: How sourcing  
mode diversity enhances innovative performance. Strategic Management Journal, 34(5) : 
610-621. 
van de Vrande, V., & Vanhaverbeke, W. 2013. How prior corporate venture capital investments 
shape technological alliances: A real options approach. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 37 (5): 1019–1043. 
van de Vrande, V., Vanhaverbeke, W., & Duysters, G. 2011. Technology in-sourcing and the 
creation of pioneering technologies. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 28: 974–
987. 
Vassolo, R. S., Anand, J., & Folta, T. B. 2004. Non-additivity in portfolios of exploration 
activities: A real options-based analysis of equity alliances in biotechnology. Strategic 
Management Journal, 25(11): 1045-1061. 
Vermeulen, F., & Barkema, H. 2002. Pace, rhythm, and scope: Process dependence in building a 
profitable multinational corporation. Strategic Management Journal, 23(7), 637-653. 
Verspagen, B., & Schoenmakers, W. 2004. The spatial dimension of patenting by multinational 
firms in Europe. Journal of Economic Geography, 4(1): 23-42. 
Wadhwa, A., & Kotha, S. 2006. Knowledge creation through external venturing: Evidence from 
the telecommunications equipment manufacturing industry. Academy of Management 
Journal 49(4): 1-17.  
Wadhwa, A., Phelps, C., Kotha., S. 2015. Corporate Venture Capital Portfolios and Firm 
Innovation. Journal of Business Venturing 13 (1): 95-112. 
Wadhwa, A., Phelps, C., & Kotha, S. 2010. Creating exploratory innovations by learning from 
entrepreneurial ventures. In New Frontiers in Entrepreneurship (pp. 147-173). Springer 
New York. 
Winter, S. 1987. Knowledge and competence as strategic assets. David J. Teece, ed. The 
Competitive Challenge-Strategies for Industrial Innovation and Renewal. Ballinger, 
Cambridge, MA, 159-184. 
40 
 
Yang, Y., Narayanan, V. K., De Carolis, D.M. 2014. The Relationship between Portfolio 
Diversification and Firm Value: The Evidence from Corporate Venture Capital Activity. 
Strategic Management Journal, 35: 1993-2001. 
Zahra, S. A., & Hayton, J. C. 2008. The effect of international venturing on firm performance: 
The moderating influence of absorptive capacity. Journal of Business Venturing, 23(2), 
195-220. 
Zhang, Y., Li, H. and Zhou, L. 2010. FDI spillovers in an emerging market: the role of foreign 
firms’ country origin diversity and domestic firms’ absorptive capacity, Strategic 
Management Journal, 31: 969–989.  
Zollo, M., Reuer, J. J., & Singh, H. 2002. Interorganizational routines and performance in 
strategic alliances, Organization Science, 13: 701-713. 
  
41 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for sample firms 
 
 Variables Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Technological performance 372.16 440.92 0.00 2305.00                       
2 Pre-sample mean 281.87 294.15 0.60 1480.00 0.89                    
3 Firm size  16.67 2.57 0.01 19.30 0.27 0.31                  
4 Leverage 32.8 23.52 0.00 112.57 -0.21 -0.17 0.22                
5 Firm liquidity 1.61 2.6 0.00 50.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.47 -0.19              
6 R&D  6.83 1.74 0.43 9.41 0.49 0.55 0.51 -0.10 -0.07            
7 Portfolio size  2.54 1.26 0.00 4.88 0.40 0.43 0.23 -0.21 0.01 0.69          
8 CVC tech relatedness 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.69 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.23 -0.01 0.21 0.45        
9 CVC tech relatedness squared 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.48 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.23 0.00 0.17 0.38 0.96     
10 CVC market focus 0.45 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.16 -0.02 -0.16 0.06 0.31 0.61 0.45 0.37  
11 CVC market focus squared 0.36 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.13 -0.02 -0.14 0.07 0.31 0.62 0.48 0.40 0.98 
12 Tech diversity CVC 0.09 0.17 0.00 0.80 0.22 0.18 -0.01 -0.07 0.08 0.10 0.36 0.25 0.17 0.41 
13 Tech diversity alliances 0.18 0.20 0.00 0.86 0.34 0.37 0.22 -0.05 -0.05 0.41 0.47 0.02 0.01 0.23 
14 Tech diversity M&A 0.07 0.18 0.00 0.80 0.33 0.31 0.13 -0.06 -0.03 0.21 0.31 0.20 0.15 0.22 
15 Host country alliance experience  0.58 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.41 0.47 0.38 -0.17 -0.06 0.74 0.78 0.26 0.22 0.34 
16 Host country CVC experience  0.41 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.17 -0.05 -0.07 0.07 0.31 0.56 0.29 0.24 0.66 
17 Tech overlap alliances and CVC 0.10 0.22 0.00 0.97 0.21 0.19 0.03 -0.16 -0.02 0.23 0.47 0.29 0.24 0.45 
18 CVC portfolio maturity 1.59 1.25 0.00 4.00 -0.00 0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.06 -0.08 0.10 
19 Geo diversity alliances 2.49 1.74 0.00 9.66 0.35 0.34 0.23 0.01 -0.03 0.49 0.63 0.11 0.06 0.30 
20 Geo diversity alliances squared 9.22 12.51 0.00 93.32 0.24 0.21 0.15 0.06 -0.03 0.28 0.43 0.07 0.03 0.25 
21 Geo diversity CVC 1.38 0.56 0.00 4.50 0.18 0.17 -0.01 -0.16 0.07 0.18 0.48 0.39 0.30 0.65 
22 Geo diversity CVC squared 2.21 2.20 0.00 20.25 0.13 0.10 -0.03 -0.11 0.07 0.06 0.29 0.31 0.25 0.46 
23 Knowledge redundancy 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.50 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.25 0.08 0.24 0.45 0.44 0.40 0.43 
 
Note. Correlations based on 385 observations for 55 firms. Correlations greater than |.10| are statistically significant at an alpha level of .05, and correlations greater than |.13| 
are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Means and standard deviations of the alliance and CVC related variables are for firms that have positive values. R&D, firm 
size and portfolio size are taken in natural logarithm—see the main text for the definition of variables.
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Table 1 continued 
 
 
 Variables 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
12 Tech diversity CVC 0.39            
13 Tech diversity alliances 0.22 0.15           
14 Tech diversity M&A 0.21 0.09 0.15          
15 Host country alliance experience  0.35 0.13 0.52 0.25                 
16 Host country CVC experience  0.66 0.32 0.28 0.13 0.36              
17 Tech overlap alliances and CVC 0.48 0.54 0.26 0.14 0.33 0.38            
18 CVC portfolio maturity 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.29 -0.12          
19 Geo diversity alliances 0.32 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.50 0.29 0.20 -0.06        
20 Geo diversity alliances squared 0.27 0.19 0.27 0.18 0.29 0.20 0.12 -0.06 0.92      
21 Geo diversity CVC 0.62 0.47 0.10 0.12 0.20 0.52 0.31 0.29 0.15 0.14    
22 Geo diversity CVC squared 0.45 0.42 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.32 0.20 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.89  
23 Knowledge  redundancy 0.44 0.19 0.08 0.18 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.12 0.17 0.07 0.34 0.18 
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Table 2. The effects of CVC Geographic Diversity on Technological Performance 
                Model I    Model II       Model III    Model IV    
Pre-sample mean  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002*** 
             (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
Inverse Mill's ratio -0.034    -0.082    -0.153    -0.174    
             (0.123)    (0.123)    (0.125)    (0.124)    
Firm size     0.098***  0.093**   0.101***  0.105*** 
             (0.038)    (0.039)    (0.038)    (0.037)    
Leverage     -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
             (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    
Firm liquidity -0.045    -0.049    -0.053*   -0.053*   
             (0.033)    (0.033)    (0.031)    (0.030)    
R&D      0.374***  0.379***  0.345***  0.342*** 
             (0.056)    (0.056)    (0.054)    (0.053)    
Portfolio size   0.002    -0.074    -0.135*   -0.130*   
             (0.076)    (0.076)    (0.077)    (0.077)    
CVC tech relatedness  1.121     0.770     0.867     0.979    
             (0.819)    (0.818)    (0.780)    (0.791)    
CVC tech relatedness squared -2.863*   -2.225    -2.336    -2.295    
             (1.549)    (1.550)    (1.510)    (1.587)    
CVC market focus       0.763*    0.583     0.333     0.288    
             (0.450)    (0.461)    (0.436)    (0.428)    
CVC market focus squared    -1.196**  -1.190**  -0.820*   -0.736    
             (0.506)    (0.515)    (0.493)    (0.484)    
Tech diversity CVC  0.253     0.195     0.363     0.370    
             (0.249)    (0.264)    (0.252)    (0.251)    
Tech diversity alliances  0.699***  0.788***  0.562**   0.515**  
             (0.232)    (0.229)    (0.230)    (0.229)    
Tech diversity M&A -0.048     0.010    -0.042    -0.021    
             (0.173)    (0.179)    (0.173)    (0.169)    
Host country alliance experience  -0.067    -0.019     0.088     0.090    
             (0.185)    (0.176)    (0.173)    (0.171)    
Host country CVC experience   0.235**   0.220*    0.295***  0.274**  
             (0.116)    (0.114)    (0.108)    (0.107)    
Tech overlap alliances and CVC -0.407*   -0.467**  -0.497**  -0.460**  
             (0.220)    (0.229)    (0.218)    (0.218)    
CVC portfolio maturity  -0.109*** -0.175*** -0.184*** -0.172*** 
             (0.040)    (0.046)    (0.050)    (0.051)    
Geo diversity alliances  0.010     0.045     0.180**   0.201**  
             (0.086)    (0.087)    (0.081)    (0.083)    
Geo diversity alliances squared  0.005     0.003     0.007     0.004    
             (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.008)    (0.008)    
Geo diversity CVC             0.435***  1.014***  1.021*** 
                       (0.154)    (0.189)    (0.188)    
Geo diversity CVC squared           -0.095**  -0.218*** -0.224*** 
                       (0.038)    (0.045)    (0.044)    
Geo diversity CVC x Geo diversity alliances                      -0.228*** -0.223*** 
                    (0.049)    (0.049)    
Geo diversity CVC squared x Geo diversity alliances                      0.043**   0.044**  
                     (0.019)    (0.019)    
Knowledge redundancy                                 -0.895*   
                                           (0.468)    
Log-likelihood -2372.8    -2369.2    -2358.6    -2357.2    
R2 0.10 0.10     0.11   0.11      
Wald test of model significance        1025.4***    1079.9***    1227.7***    1267.1***    
Over-dispersion parameter       0.498***     0.490***     0.464***     0.461***    
Notes: Results of pseudo fixed effects negative binomial models with robust standard errors. The models are 
estimated on 385 observations for 55 firms. Constant and 6 time dummies included. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual Model: Interplay of CVC Geographic Diversity with Technology Alliances 
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Figure 2. Predicted Technological Performance as a function of the Geographic Diversity 
of CVC Investments and the Geographic Diversity of Alliances (Complexity) 
 
 
 
Notes: Graphs are drawn with all other variables taken at the sample mean. Low-level geographic diversity is 
diversity at the mean minus one standard deviation and high-level is at the mean plus one standard deviation. 
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